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Abstract 
To coordinate with other agents in its envi­
ronment, an agent needs models of what the 
other agents are trying to do. When com­
munication is impossible or expensive, this 
information must be acquired indirectly via 
plan recognition. Typical approaches to plan 
recognition start with a specification of the 
possible plans the other agents may be follow­
ing, and develop special techniques for dis­
criminating among the possibilities. Perhaps 
more desirable would be a uniform procedure 
for mapping plans to general structures sup­
porting inference based on uncertain and in­
complete observations. In this paper, we de­
scribe a set of methods for converting plans 
represented in a flexible procedural language 
to observation models represented as proba­
bilistic belief networks. 
1 Introduction 
Decisions about what to do should be based on knowl­
edge of the current situation and expectations about 
possible future actions and events. Anticipating the 
actions that others might take requires models of their 
decision-making strategies, including models of goals 
that they are pursuing. Unfortunately, ascertaining 
the goals of others can be problematic. In competi­
tive situations, agents may forfeit some advantage by 
revealing their true goals. Even in cooperative situ­
ations, explicit dialogue about goals can be impossi­
ble or undesirable given possible failures, restrictions, 
costs, or risks. 
Agents that function in environments where explicit 
communication about goals is often impractical need 
alternative means to ascertain each others' goals, such 
as recognizing the plans and goals of other agents by 
observing their actions. To perform plan recognition, 
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an observing agent needs a model of the observed 
agent's possible goals and plans, and what actions 
the observed agent could take to accomplish those 
plans and goals. We focus on the case of collaborative 
agents, where efficient and effective team coordination 
requires good models of each team participant's goals 
and plans. If we assume that team participants will 
either be designed or trained similarly, then they will 
have similar or identical knowledge for planning ac­
tions to achieve goals. Unfortunately, however, knowl­
edge of the plan structures of the other agents does 
not, by itself permit the agent to perform plan recog­
nition. 
To perform plan recognition, therefore, an agent needs 
to reason from the evidence provided by observations 
of other agents' activities. An agent's actions are, in 
general, applicable toward a number of different goals, 
so that observation of any single action will not provide 
enough evidence to disambiguate the goal that moti­
vated the agent's choice of action. Sequences of ac­
tions will tend to disambiguate th� intentions of other 
agents, as the hypotheses that are consistent with all 
(or many) of the observed agents' actions gain more 
and more support. 
An agent therefore needs to be able to take the plan 
structures that it has for another agent and convert 
them to a model that relates plans to observable ac­
tions. In this paper, we describe a method that takes 
plans as generated by a planning system, and creates a 
belief network model in support of the plan recognition 
task. 
2 Related Work 
An issue common to all plan recognition systems is the 
source and availability of the plan structure, which 
defines the relationships among goals, subgoals, and 
primitive actions. Many different plan structures have 
been utilized, including hierarchies of varying forrns 
(plan spaces [CLM84] , action taxonomies [KA86] , 
AND/OR trees [Cal89] , context models [Car90J, plan 
libraries [LG91]), associative networks [CC91], Shared­
Plans [LGS90], plan schemas [GL90], and multi-agent 
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templates [ AFH89]. All of these structures were de­
signed specifically to support the plan recognition task. 
The direct output of a planning system, in contrast, 
is an object designed to be executed, not recognized. 
For the most part, prior work has not addressed the 
problem of how the plan recognition structures are (or 
could be) derived from executable plans as generated 
by planning systems. 
In our research, we start from a language designed 
(not by us) for plan specification, as opposed to plan 
recognition. The particular language we have adopted 
is PRS [IGR92, IG90], though any standard plan lan­
guage would serve just as well. PRS was chosen for 
a number of reasons, including that it supports all of 
the standard planning constructs such as conditional 
branching, context, iteration1, subgoaling, etc. PRS 
also has a hierarchically structured plan representa­
tion which we exploit to create belief networks that 
are organized in a similar, hierarchical manner. 
From a PRS plan, we generate a model that directly 
serves plan recognition by relating potential observa­
tions to the candidate plans. The model we gener­
ate is in the form of a probabilistic belief network 
(henceforth: belief network) [Pea88], which expresses 
probabilistically the causal relations among under­
lying goals, intentions, and the resulting observable 
actions.2 
Our research bears the strongest resemblance to Gold­
man and Charniak's prior work on plan recognition 
using belief networks [CG93]. Like ours, their sys­
tem generates a belief network dynamically to solve 
a plan recognition problem. There are several signif­
icant differences, however. First, the plan language 
they employ is a predicate-calculas-like representation 
based on collections of actions with slot fillers with 
hierarchical action descriptions. This representation 
seems well suited for modeling part-subpart relation­
ships (goal/subgoal and is-a), and their target domain 
of story understanding and may have influenced this. 
Our plan language is based upon PRS, which has a 
very different set of structural primitives, including 
explicit sequencing, conditionalization, iteration and 
context. PRS is a general purpose planner, with a 
representation that is intended to permit any form of 
plan structure. 
Second, Goldman and Charniak first translate plan 
knowledge into an associative network (their term) by 
using a set of generic rules for instantiating (unifying) 
the network with the plan knowledge. It is these in­
stantiated rules from which they dynamically generate 
a belief network for a given sequence of observations 
1 Our methodology does not currently support iteration, 
although this is being investigated. 
2The issue of probabilistic plan recognition is orthog­
onal to the issue of probabilistic planning ( cf. BURl­
DAN [KHW93), for example) and hence the representa­
tions created for planning under uncertainty are not inher­
ently any more conducive to the plan recognition process. 
(i.e. bottom-up). Our system, on the other hand, 
generates a belief network from the plan representa­
tion itself, and before receiving any observations (i.e. 
top-down). We foresee the top-down approach having 
the characteristic of being able to prune (perhaps sig­
nificant) portions of the resulting belief network based 
upon the context in which the plan recognition sys­
tem finds itself. We believe these approaches are com­
plementary, both in addressing separate sets of plan­
language issues, and in emphasizing different forms of 
dynamism in model generation. 
Finally, this work is related to a growing body of 
other work in the the dynamic generation of belief 
networks [Bre92, WBG92]. Although our methods are 
specifically geared to plan recognition (like Goldman 
and Charniak's), techniques for generating probabilis­
tic models from other forms of knowledge may have 
wider applicability. 
3 PRS and Belief Networks 
The Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) [IGR92, 
IG90] specifies plans as collections of actions orga­
nized into Knowledge Areas, or KAs. PRS KAs spec­
ify how plans are selected given the current goal (its 
purpose) and situation (its context). PRS KAs also 
specify a procedure, called the KA body, which it fol­
lows while attempting to accomplish its intended goal. 
This procedure is represented as a directed graph in 
which nodes represent states in the world and arcs 
represent actions or subgoals. Actions may consist of 
primitive operations (indicated by * in KA diagrams), 
goals to achieve (!), goals to maintain (#), goals to 
be tested (?), or conditions to be waited upon ( ' ). 
KA actions may also assert facts (---. ), or retract them 
( +-). Branches in the graph may be of type AND 
or OR, indicating, respectively, that all or only one 
of the branches must be completed successfully in or­
der to satisfy the KA's purpose. See the PRS papers 
[IGR92, IG90] for a more detailed description. 
A belief network is a directed acyclic graph ( F, X) rep­
resenting the dependencies F among a set of random 
variables X. Each random variable x; E X ranges over 
a domain of OUtcomeS n; I with a COnditional proba­
bility distribution II; specifying the probabilities for 
X; = Wj for all w; E n;' given all combinations of 
outcome values for the predecessors of x; in the net­
work. For a more thorough account of belief networks, 
see, for example, [Pea88] or [Nea90]. To avoid confu­
sion, we refer to the action and goal nodes in a KA as 
nodes, and the nodes of a belief network as (random) 
variables. 
4 The Mapping Method 
We now describe our method for mapping plans into 
belief networks, first with simple sequences of actions 
and then with more complex plan structures. The re-
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Name: perform bound 
Purpose: t bound_pertormed 
Context enemy_in 
vicinity 
(a) 
(b) 
'"find_cover 
� 
ane�_in vicinity 
Figure 1: (a) Single level, non-branching KA. (b) Be­
lief network. 
suiting procedures a broad class of plans, including 
those with conditional branching and subgoaling. Two 
notable features that we do not cover, however, are it­
eration (or recursion), and plan variables. Both are 
left for future work. 
In the remainder of the section, we discuss the basic 
operations involved in mapping PRS KAs to belief net­
works. Our description is illustrated with an example 
military reconaissance task, in which two (or more) 
cooperative agents pass through a sequence of loca­
tions, alternately navigating (also called bounding) or 
protectively watching ( overwatching) while concealed 
from view. 
4.1 Single, non-branching plans 
Figure l(a) depicts an example PRS plan consisting of 
a simple sequence of primitive actions. This KA says 
that in order to achieve the goal of accomplishing a 
"bound" goal, the operations of moving to the next 
location (the via point) and finding a place of con­
cealment must be accomplished. Knowing this, if an 
observer were to see an agent moving toward a grove 
of trees, the observer might predict that the observed 
agent was about to enter the grove. We would like the 
belief network generated from this KA to support this 
sort of inference. 
The first step in creating the belief network is to create 
a variable representing the goal to be achieved by the 
KA. The remaining variables, connections, and proba­
bilities all provide evidence for or against the proposi­
tion that this is the goal being pursued by the observed 
agent. In our figures, we use the KA's name for the 
variable in the belief network representing the KA's 
goal. 
We now create a new random variable for each ac­
tion in the KA. The state space for each variable 
is determined by whether the action is a goal�with 
a state space of {Inactive, Active, Achieved}, or a 
primitive action (a basic, non-decomposable behav­
ior of the agent)�with a state space of {Performed, 
NotPerformed}. Each of these new variables is de­
pendent upon the KA's goal variable because it is the 
adoption of this goal that causes the performance of 
these actions in this particular sequence.3 To model 
the temporal relationship between move_to_viapt and 
find_cover, we create an arc between these variables.4 
Because we are constructing the belief network in order 
to perform plan recognition, it is important to model 
the uncertainty associated with observations [HD93]. 
For example, detecting the exact movements of an­
other agent might be error-prone, while it might be 
easy to ascertain when the agent enters a grove of 
trees. Yet whether this entry represents a concealment 
action may be relatively less certain. To capture these 
differences, we add evidence variables to represent the 
relation between an observation and our belief that the 
observed event is an instance of the corresponding ac­
tion. Evidence variables also provide a way to account 
for features that, while not corresponding to actions 
directly, provide some information regarding whether 
the action was performed. This indirect evidence is 
often all we have, as some fundamental actions may 
be inherently unobservable. In Figure l(b), we indi­
cate evidence variables by drawing them with heavy 
outlines.5 
A typical KA also specifies the context in which it is 
useful, which restricts its applicability for the associ­
ated goal. For example, the "bounding overwatch" 
technique of travel between locations might only be 
necessary when enemy forces are in the vicinity. To 
capture these constraints in the belief network, we add 
one new variable for each condition in the KA's con­
text, and include a dependency link from the goal to 
each context variable. The belief network constructed 
for the KA shown in Figure 1( a) is shown in Fig­
ure l{b ). 
The last task is to determine the probability distribu­
tions for each of the random variables. Unfortunately, 
information about the degree of uncertainty in these 
relationships is not inherent in the executable plan de­
scription, and no planning system provides this prob­
abilistic knowledge as a matter of course. We could 
specify this information separately based on our own 
subjective assessment of the domain, or it could be 
3In our depiction of belief networks, we distinguish 
among the various sources of dependency graphically by 
line type: subgoal/subaction arcs are normal-weight solid 
lines, inhibitory arcs are normal-weight dashed lines, tem­
poral dependency arcs are heavy dashed lines, and context 
arcs are heavy solid lines. 
4To apply this technique for a plan language support­
ing partially ordered actions, we would simply omit the 
temporal dependency arcs between steps in plans that are 
unordered. 
5In subsequent figures, for simplicity, we treat evidence 
implicitly by depicting the pair of action and evidence as 
a single variable. 
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Name: moYa to next viapl � 
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� 
F igure 2: (a) Multi-level KA. (b) Corresponding belief 
network. 
estimated syntactically by analyzing the frequency of 
occurrence of particular actions among all those that 
achieve particular goals. Alternately, the probabili­
ties might be determined through empirical study of 
the frequency of occurrence of goals and actions dur­
ing the execution of the plans in actual situations. If 
there is no available probabilistic information , a de­
fault assignment of equiprobability among alternatives 
can be used to indicate this lack of knowledge. This 
would permit a belief network to be fully specified in 
the presence of incomplete modeling information while 
perhaps still providing useful inferences based upon 
the part of the model that was specified. 
Some of the dependencies of the constructed belief net­
work are generically specifiable, however. For exam­
ple, the relation between goal and context variables (if 
they represent true constraints) are partially determin­
istic, as the goal cannot be active unless the context 
condition is satisfied. 
The procedure for subgoaling plans is essentially the 
same as that for the single-level case, with the ex­
tension that subgoals need to be expanded into their 
constituent KA procedure. This requires treating the 
subgoal as a goal variable in Section 4.1. An ex­
ample multi-level KA is shown in Figure 2(a), and 
Figure 2(b) depicts its corresponding belief network. 
Notice that the belief network structure beneath the 
move_to_nexLviapt variable has the same form as that 
of perform_bound in Figure l(b ). 
4.2 Conditional plans 
For plans with conditional branches, the KA's goal is 
again the root variable for the belief network. Each 
action in the KA body becomes a random variable 
in the network as in the mapping specified in Sec­
tion 4.1. However, in the conditional case, not all 
actions are linked. For instance, an OR branching 
in a KA means that an agent need only successfully 
execute one of those branches. We assume that one 
branch is executed (either successfully or unsuccess-
Name: hide 
Purpose: I hidden 
Context: none 
r-CD---..1 
•tind_ooncealing_foliage *find_ooncealing_object 
� � 
•move_int�foliage •move_lnd_object 
(a) 
------
(b) 
Figure 3: (a) Single plan with OR branch. (b) Corre­
sponding belief network. 
fully) before another one is tried, so that only one 
sequence of actions will be active at one time. There­
fore, the action variables within a branch are linked 
temporally as in a non-branching plan, and the vari­
ables representing the first actions in each of the dis­
junctive branches are linked with inhibitory arcs rep­
resenting their exclusivity. The effect of this arc is 
that positive belief that the agent is pursuing one 
of the branches will inhibit belief in the alternative 
branch(es).6 For AND branches, we can similarly as­
sume either independence (our default), or a positive 
mutual reinforcement among branches. An example of 
a KA with an OR branch, and the resulting belief net­
work, are shown in Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b), respec­
tively. If the branch were an AND instead, the same 
belief network would result, minus the arc between 
find_concealing_foliage and find_concealing_object. 
4.3 Multiple goals, multiple plans 
Quite often, there are several top-level goals that an 
agent may be pursuing. To represent the interde­
pendencies between multiple top-level goals, we adopt 
the convention of always creating an arc between the 
top-level goal variables and modeling the dependence 
(or independence) through the conditional probabili­
ties associated with these variables. An example of a 
mapping for this type of plan to a belief network is 
shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
Thus far we have assumed that an agent being ob­
served is pursuing only a single approach (KA) to sat­
isfy each of its goals. However, there are often multiple 
KAs for any goal. The approach that we take is sim­
ilar to the mapping for OR branches. We first create 
an abstract goal variable that encompasses the KAs 
6The assumption of exclusivity can be relaxed by suit­
able assignments of inhibitory probabilities. Or, we could 
alternately have chosen to assume that pursuit of the alter­
nate branches are independent, in which case the inhibitory 
dependencies would be unnecessary. 
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Purpose: I bound 
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Name: hide 
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•move_to_next_viapt 'find_concealing_foliage 
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'find_ cover ·move_into_foliage 
J 
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Figure 4: Multiple top-level plans. 
�------- �----- .,.....,.-----.--....... __ .---- -'-..e_orform_ )"'" ""<�-. hide 
�::.� �:=-�··-,__.........,..,..__ 
Figure 5: Belief networks for multiple top-level plans. 
with a common purpose (goal). The variables that 
represent each of the alternate plans (KAs) are then 
connected, with the alternate plans as the dependents, 
in keeping with the future expected use of the belief 
network. An example of multiple goals is presented in 
Figures 6 and 7. 
4.4 Summary 
The following t.able (Table 1) shows a summary of the 
mapping methods, with the various plan features in 
the left column and their corresponding belief network 
topology in the right column. 
l Plan Construct I Belief Net Topology 
Subgoal/ Action new variable for subgoal/action, 
sub goal/ action variable is child 
of the supergoal variable. 
Action new variable for each action, 
Sequence each action variable is child of 
KA's goal variable, temporal 
arcs between steps. 
Context new variable for context, context 
variable becomes child of goal 
variable. 
OR Branch separate action sequences for 
each branch, branch node 
variable is parent to all initial 
action variables of each branch, 
inhibitory arcs between initial 
action variables of each branch 
AND Branch same as OR branch but without 
the inhibitory arcs. 
Multiple Goals separate variable for each goal, 
inhibitory arcs between 
competing goals. 
Table 1: Mapping methodology summary. 
5 An Example 
The following example illustrates the entire process, 
mapping PRS plan structures to a belief network, and 
using the result for plan recognition. 
5.1 Mapping to belief network 
Figure 8 depicts four KAs relevant to the bounding 
overwatch task. The !bound-performed KA shows that 
the agent must first move to its next via point before 
looking for a suitable place from which to watch over 
the other agent. There are two KAs for dealing with 
an enemy agent, both conditioned on the context of an 
enemy agent having been sighted. Hiding, however, 
can consist of either moving into foliage or moving 
behind some concealing object. Furthermore, moving 
to a via point requires the agent to first accomplish 
!moved_to_nexLviapt, the rightmost KA in Figure 8, 
which consists of a simple, non-branching sequence of 
operations. 
Using the methods described in Section 4, the sys­
tem begins mapping this collection of KAs into a 
belief network, starting with the top-level goals of 
.lbound_performed and !dea/Lwith_enemy. The system 
finds that the first action in the !bound_performed KA 
is the goal .lmoved_to_nexLviapt and recurses. The 
'moved_to_nexLviapt KA is straightforwardly added 
and the mapping of !bound_performed resumes. The 
system then proceeds to map !dealLwith_enemy. As 
!dealLwith_enemy has two potentially applicable KAs, 
the methodology of Section 4.3 is used, where each 
KA is processed individually and then joined by an 
abstract goal variable representing both KAs. In ad­
dition, the OR branch in the hide KA complicates the 
construction a bit by introducing additional dependen­
cies (as discussed above in Section 4.2). To complete 
the mapping, the system creates an inhibitory link be­
tween the two top-level goals ( !bound_performed and 
!dea/Lwith_enemy) to indicate that only one OR the 
other of these goals can be achieved at the same time. 
The finished belief network structure is shown in Fig­
ure 9. The marginal and conditional probabilities are 
then loaded into the network (as mentioned in Sec­
tion 4). We now show how the new representation 
permits an agent to infer the plans and goals of an­
other agent based on its observed behavior. 
5.2 Plan recognition 
Suppose that Agent A is watching Agent B as they 
perform a reconnaisance task. Agent A and Agent B 
are in the military so of course there are standard 
operating procedures for everything. In this case 
the agents are using bounding-overwatch for reconnai­
sance, which means that one agent moves while the 
other agent watches for danger while concealed, with 
the two agents alternating between roles. These pro­
cedures are represented by the KAs in Figure 8, which 
get mapped into the belief network structure shown 
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Figure 6: Multiple top-level KAs of observed agent. 
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Figure 7: Belief network for multiple top-level goals. 
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Figure 9: Final belief network representation. 
in Figure 9. Agent A observes the actions taken by 
Agent B, and, whenever an action is performed that 
fits into the model, Agent A adds this information 
to the belief network. After the evidence is propa­
gated, the resulting probability distributions represent 
Agent A's beliefs about Agent B's goals posterior to 
the evidence. 
Starting with a belief network without any applied ev­
idence, suppose Agent A notices that Agent B moves 
in the direction of, and arrives at, the next stop in the 
reconnaisance route. 7 Agent A interprets this as hav­
ing completed !moved_to_nexLviapt (an example of the 
ability to make observations at a higher level than the 
"primitive" action level) and propagates this evidence 
through the network. This results in distributions of 
perform_bound: Inactive 0.19; Active 0.69, Achieved 
0.11, and deaLwith_enemy: Inactive 0.41; Active 0.49; 
Achieved 0.09. The relatively high level of belief in 
the deaLwith_enemy goal is due to its having a high 
prior. This evidence alone suggests to Agent A that 
Agent B might be involved with performing the bound­
ing role of the reconnaisance task, but it is not entirely 
clear at this point. Agent A determines, based upon 
its beliefs, that it should continue to watch for enemy 
agents. Continuing, if Agent A later observes Agent B 
moving into cover, Agent A now strongly believes that 
Agent B is finishing its bound process with beliefs of 
perform_bound: Inactive 0.0; Active 0.17, Achieved 
0.83, and deaf_with_enemy: Inactive 0.62; Active 0.32; 
Achieved 0.06. However, if instead of moving to a 
7Until Agent B actually arrives at the via point, its 
movements might be ambiguous enough that it is unclear 
which of the move-type observations should be instanti­
ated. In this case, evidence for all of them might be in­
stantiated and the resulting beliefs used, providing Agent A 
with at least some information. 
via point, Agent B moves in some other direction 
and moves into a growth of foliage, Agent A, through 
the plan recognition system, realizes that Agent B es­
tablished a goal of hide (Inactive 0.03, Active 0.51, 
Achieved 0.46) since it has detected an enemy (Per­
formed 0.64, NotPerformed 0.36) and that it should 
therefore come to its aid. 
6 Conclusions 
We have described methods by which plans in their ex­
ecutable form can be automatically mapped to belief 
networks. The examples of the implemented system 
illustrate that, at least for the simple plans so far ex­
plored, our methods yield belief networks that allow 
agents to recognize the plans of others. In the near fu­
ture we plan to extend our methodology to deal with 
iteration and recursion, and to implement this system 
on physically embodied agents (robots) that will use 
plan recognition as part of their coordination mecha­
ntsm. 
While much work yet remains, we see these methods 
as important steps toward knowledge re-use, where au­
tomating the mapping process allows the same knowl­
edge to be used for both planning and plan recognition. 
Moreover, just as concerns about storing all possible 
plans for all possible combinations of goals and worlds 
led to algorithms for dynamically constructing plans 
on the fly, so too do concerns about building unwieldy 
models of agents' actions in all possible worlds lead to 
a desire for dynamically constructing belief network 
models for situation-specific plan recognition activi­
ties. Our methods represent some initial steps in this 
direction. 
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